Concept of State Responsibility
Meaning and Basis
State Responsibility is a fundamental principle of public international law establishing that whenever a state commits an internationally wrongful act against another state, it is held responsible for that act and must make reparation for any injury caused. It is the necessary corollary of a right; all rights of an international character involve international responsibility. This principle ensures that states honour their international obligations and provides a framework for addressing breaches.
The rules of state responsibility are themselves secondary rules. They do not define the content of the obligations (e.g., the prohibition of torture). Instead, they determine the legal consequences of failing to fulfil those primary obligations. The most authoritative codification of these rules is found in the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 2001. While not a treaty, ARSIWA is widely regarded as reflecting customary international law.
The basis for this principle was articulated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the landmark Chorzów Factory case (1928), where the court stated that it is a "principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation."
Attribution of wrongful acts to the State
A state is an abstract legal entity. It can only act by and through individuals and groups of individuals. Therefore, a central question in state responsibility is determining when an act committed by a person can be considered an "act of the State." This legal link is known as attribution or imputation. The rules of attribution define the scope of a state's responsibility for the conduct of others.
ARSIWA provides a comprehensive set of rules for attribution. The general principle is that a state is responsible for the conduct of its organs and officials, even when they act outside their authority, but is generally not responsible for the conduct of private individuals, unless a specific link to the state can be established.
Article (ARSIWA) | Conduct Attributed to the State | Explanation |
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Article 4 | Conduct of organs of the State | Any act of a state organ (legislative, executive, judicial, or other) at any level (central or local) is considered an act of the state. This is the most common basis for attribution. |
Article 5 | Conduct of persons exercising elements of governmental authority | This covers acts of entities that are not state organs but are empowered by state law to exercise governmental functions (e.g., a private security firm running a prison). |
Article 7 | Conduct in excess of authority (ultra vires) | A state is responsible for the acts of its officials even if they exceed their authority or disobey instructions, as long as they are acting in their official capacity. |
Article 8 | Conduct directed or controlled by the State | Acts of private persons are attributable if they are acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, the state. The ICJ in the Nicaragua case set a high threshold of "effective control" for this. |
Article 11 | Conduct acknowledged and adopted by the State | A state can become responsible for a private act if it subsequently acknowledges and adopts the conduct as its own. |
Elements of State Responsibility
According to Article 2 of ARSIWA, there is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission:
(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.
These two elements—attribution and breach—are the essential conditions for state responsibility to arise. It is important to note that fault (intent or negligence) and damage are not generally considered necessary elements for an act to be wrongful, although they may be relevant in determining the extent of reparation.
Attributable act or omission
This is the subjective element. As discussed previously, the conduct must be linked to the state through the rules of attribution. The conduct can be either an action (commissio) or a failure to act (omissio).
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Action: For example, the act of a state's military in shooting down a foreign civilian airliner.
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Omission: For example, the failure of a state to protect a foreign embassy from being attacked by a mob, or a failure to warn other states of a known hazard in its territorial waters (as in the Corfu Channel case).
The conduct must be attributable to the state. If the act was committed by a purely private individual with no connection to the state, the first element is not met, and the state is not responsible for the act itself (though it might be responsible for a separate omission, such as failing to prevent or punish the individual's act).
Breach of an international obligation
This is the objective element. The conduct attributable to the state must violate a legal obligation that the state owes under international law. This is defined in Article 12 of ARSIWA, which states that there is a breach when an act of that State is "not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character."
Key points regarding this element:
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Source of Obligation: The source is irrelevant. The obligation can arise from a treaty, a rule of customary international law, a binding decision of an international organization, or a general principle of law.
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Irrelevance of Domestic Law: A state cannot justify its failure to comply with an international obligation by invoking its own domestic law. Article 3 of ARSIWA makes it clear that the characterization of an act as internationally wrongful is governed by international law alone.
Example 1. The Tehran Hostages Case (USA v. Iran), 1980.
In 1979, during the Iranian Revolution, a group of militant students attacked and seized the US Embassy in Tehran, taking American diplomatic and consular staff hostage. Initially, the student militants were private actors.
Answer:
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) analyzed the situation in two phases, which perfectly illustrates the elements of state responsibility:
Phase 1: The Initial Attack
- Attribution: The ICJ found that the militants were private individuals, and their actions could not be directly attributed to the Iranian State at the moment of the attack.
- Breach: However, Iran was responsible for a separate breach by omission. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Iran had a duty to protect the US Embassy. The Court found that Iranian authorities were fully aware of their obligation but failed to take any appropriate steps to prevent the attack or stop it once it began. This omission was a breach of its international obligations.
Phase 2: The Continued Occupation
- Attribution: After the seizure, Iran's leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, and other state organs issued statements explicitly approving and endorsing the hostage-taking. They declared that the embassy was a "centre of espionage" and that the situation would continue until the US handed over the former Shah. The ICJ found that through these statements, Iran had acknowledged and adopted the acts of the militants as its own (as per Article 11 of ARSIWA). The private action was transformed into an act of the state.
- Breach: This new attributable act constituted a direct and continuing breach of Iran's obligations to release the diplomats and respect the inviolability of the embassy.
The case demonstrates how responsibility can arise from both an omission (failure to protect) and a subsequent action (adoption of private conduct).
Attribution of Conduct to the State
Conduct of State organs
The most fundamental and straightforward rule of attribution is that a state is responsible for the conduct of its own organs. This principle, codified in Article 4 of the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility (ARSIWA), forms the bedrock of state responsibility. A state, being an abstract entity, acts through its organs, and their actions are legally considered the actions of the state itself.
Key Aspects of Article 4:
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Broad Definition of "Organ": The term "organ" is defined broadly to include any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State. This encompasses all branches of government:
- Legislative: The passing of a law that violates a treaty obligation.
- Executive: The actions of police, military, or government officials.
- Judicial: A decision by a court that results in a denial of justice to a foreign national.
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All Levels of Government: The rule applies regardless of the organ's position in the state's structure. It covers both central government organs (e.g., a national ministry) and organs of a local or regional unit of the state (e.g., a state police force in a federal system like India, or a municipal government).
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Ultra Vires Acts (Article 7): Importantly, the state is also responsible for the conduct of its organs even if they act outside their competence or contrary to their instructions (ultra vires). As long as the official is acting with the apparent authority of their position, their wrongful act is attributable to the state. For example, if a police officer tortures a foreign detainee in violation of national law and police regulations, the state is still responsible on the international plane.
Example 1. A soldier in the Indian Army, while on duty at the border, fires across the border without orders and kills a civilian in the neighbouring country. The neighbouring country brings a claim against India.
Answer:
The soldier's act is attributable to India. The soldier is a member of the Indian Army, which is an organ of the Indian state. Even though the soldier acted contrary to orders (an ultra vires act), he was acting in his official capacity as a soldier on duty. Under Articles 4 and 7 of ARSIWA, his conduct is considered an act of the State of India, making India responsible for the internationally wrongful act.
Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority
Modern states often delegate public functions to private or semi-private entities. Article 5 of ARSIWA addresses this reality by attributing the conduct of such entities to the state when they are exercising "elements of governmental authority."
This rule applies to persons or entities that are not state organs under Article 4 but are nonetheless empowered by the law of the State to exercise governmental functions. This ensures that a state cannot avoid its international responsibilities simply by outsourcing its public tasks.
Key Conditions for Attribution under Article 5:
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Empowered by Law: The entity must be legally authorized by the state to perform the specific function.
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Exercise of Governmental Authority: The act in question must be a performance of a governmental function, not a purely commercial or private activity. Governmental functions are those typically performed by the state, such as law enforcement, detention, or immigration control.
Example 2. A state privatizes the management of its prisons and empowers a private corporation, "SecureCells Pvt. Ltd.," to detain prisoners. A guard employed by SecureCells, a foreign national, is tortured while in custody.
Answer:
The act of torture is attributable to the state. Even though SecureCells is a private corporation and the guard is its employee, the corporation has been empowered by state law to exercise the governmental function of detention. The act of torture occurred in the exercise of that specific governmental authority. Therefore, under Article 5 of ARSIWA, the state is responsible for the wrongful act committed by the private entity's employee.
Conduct carried out under the direction or control of the State
A state can also be held responsible for the conduct of private individuals or groups if they are acting as de facto agents of the state. Article 8 of ARSIWA provides that the conduct of a person or group shall be considered an act of a State if the person or group is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.
This rule is particularly relevant in situations involving state support for non-state actors like paramilitary groups, insurgents, or private individuals.
The "Effective Control" Test
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has established a very high threshold for attributing conduct under this rule. In the Nicaragua v. United States case (1986), the ICJ examined whether the acts of the Nicaraguan contra rebels were attributable to the US, which financed, trained, and equipped them.
The Court ruled that for the conduct to be attributable, the state must have had "effective control" over the specific military or paramilitary operation during which the alleged violations occurred. Simply financing, organizing, training, and supplying the group was not sufficient to establish such control. This strict test was later reaffirmed in the Bosnian Genocide case (2007).
Example 3. State A provides funding and weapons to a rebel group in State B. The rebel group, using these weapons, attacks a civilian village in State B and commits a massacre.
Answer:
Based on the ICJ's "effective control" test, the massacre would likely not be attributable to State A under Article 8. While State A's support for the rebels might be a separate internationally wrongful act (e.g., a violation of the principle of non-intervention), the specific act of the massacre itself would not be attributed to State A unless it could be proven that State A gave the instructions for the attack or directed and controlled the specific operation in which the massacre occurred. Proving this level of effective control is extremely difficult.
Conduct adopted and recognized by the State as its own
A state can also become responsible for a purely private act after the fact. Article 11 of ARSIWA states that conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.
This is a rule of retroactive attribution. The conduct, which was initially private, is transformed into an act of the state by the state's own subsequent endorsement.
Requirements for Adoption:
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Clear and Unequivocal Endorsement: The state's acknowledgement and adoption must be clear and unambiguous. It cannot be a mere statement of support or sympathy.
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Adopting the Act Itself: The state must adopt the specific conduct as its own, not just express general approval of the objectives of the actors.
Example 4. The Tehran Hostages Case (USA v. Iran), 1980.
Answer:
This case is the quintessential example of attribution by adoption. The ICJ's analysis clearly illustrates the principle of Article 11.
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Initial Private Act: The seizure of the US Embassy and the taking of its staff as hostages were initially carried out by private militant students.
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Subsequent Adoption by the State: The ICJ found that Iran's conduct changed after the initial seizure. The Iranian government, and particularly its leader Ayatollah Khomeini, issued formal decrees and statements that explicitly approved of the hostage-taking. Iran decided to perpetuate the situation, using the continued detention of the hostages as leverage against the United States.
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Legal Consequence: The Court concluded that this official approval and decision to maintain the situation transformed the legal nature of the militants' actions. The state had effectively "adopted" their conduct, making Iran directly responsible for the continued detention of the hostages as an act of the state itself.
Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness and Consequences
Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness
In certain specific situations, an act by a state that would normally be considered a breach of an international obligation is not treated as wrongful. These situations, outlined in Chapter V of the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility (ARSIWA), are known as "circumstances precluding wrongfulness." They function as defences or justifications for non-performance of an obligation. However, it is a crucial rule that none of these circumstances can excuse the violation of a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens), such as the prohibition of genocide, slavery, or torture.
Consent
(Article 20, ARSIWA) Valid consent by a state to the commission of a given act by another state precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the consenting state. For example, if State A consents to State B's troops entering its territory for joint military exercises, State A cannot later claim that State B violated its territorial sovereignty. The consent must be validly given (i.e., not coerced) and the act must remain within the limits of the consent given.
Self-defence
(Article 21, ARSIWA) The wrongfulness of an act is precluded if it constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs. The use of force in self-defence must adhere to the principles of necessity and proportionality. Any action taken under the claim of self-defence that does not meet these strict UN Charter requirements is not lawful and its wrongfulness is not precluded.
Countermeasures
(Article 22, ARSIWA) Countermeasures are non-forcible acts taken by an injured state against a responsible state to induce the latter to comply with its obligations. These acts would otherwise be illegal but their wrongfulness is precluded because they are a response to a prior internationally wrongful act. For example, if State A breaches a trade treaty with State B, State B might suspend its own obligations under the same treaty as a countermeasure. Countermeasures must be proportionate, temporary, and must cease as soon as the responsible state complies with its obligations. They cannot involve the use of force.
Force Majeure
(Article 23, ARSIWA) Force majeure describes a situation where a state is unable to perform its obligation due to the occurrence of an irresistible force or an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation. It is a situation of absolute impossibility. For example, a state aircraft that has violated another state's airspace due to loss of control caused by extreme weather would be a case of force majeure. This defence is not available if the state contributed to the situation or had assumed the risk of its occurrence.
Distress
(Article 24, ARSIWA) Distress precludes wrongfulness where the author of the act has no other reasonable way, in a situation of distress, of saving the author's life or the lives of other persons entrusted to the author's care. Unlike force majeure, where performance is materially impossible, in distress, a choice to act in violation of an obligation exists, but it is a choice between compliance and saving human lives. The classic example is a ship or aircraft entering a state's territory without authorization to seek shelter from a life-threatening storm.
State of Necessity
(Article 25, ARSIWA) This is the most exceptional and narrowly defined circumstance. A state may invoke necessity to justify a breach of an obligation only if the act is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril, and it does not seriously impair an essential interest of the state or states towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole. The peril must be grave and imminent, and the act must be the "only way" to respond. The ICJ, in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, confirmed the existence of this rule in customary law but emphasized its exceptional nature and the strict conditions for its invocation.
Consequences of Wrongful Act
When an internationally wrongful act is committed and its wrongfulness is not precluded, specific legal consequences arise for the responsible state. These consequences are aimed at re-establishing the legal relationship that was disturbed by the breach and ensuring that the injured state is made whole.
Cessation of wrongful act
The first and most immediate obligation of the responsible state is to cease the wrongful act, if it is continuing. This is a fundamental requirement to bring the state back into compliance with international law. For instance, if a state is unlawfully occupying another state's territory, its primary obligation is to end the occupation.
In addition, the responsible state may be required to offer assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require. This is to ensure that the breach will not happen again in the future.
Reparation (Restitution, Compensation, Satisfaction)
The responsible state is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. The purpose of reparation is, as far as possible, to wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Reparation can take one or a combination of three forms, as outlined in the ARSIWA.
Form of Reparation | Article (ARSIWA) | Description |
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Restitution | Article 35 | This is the primary form of reparation. It involves re-establishing the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed (restitutio in integrum). For example, returning unlawfully seized property or releasing an unlawfully detained individual. Restitution is required unless it is materially impossible or involves a burden out of all proportion to the benefit derived from restitution instead of compensation. |
Compensation | Article 36 | If the damage is not made good by restitution, the responsible state is obligated to pay compensation. Compensation covers any financially assessable damage, including loss of profits. It is the most common form of reparation in practice. For example, paying for the value of a destroyed aircraft or the economic losses resulting from a broken trade agreement. |
Satisfaction | Article 37 | Satisfaction is a remedy for non-material injury, also known as moral or political injury to the dignity, honour, and prestige of a state. It is used when the injury cannot be repaired by restitution or compensation. Satisfaction may consist of an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology, or another appropriate modality. It must not be out of proportion to the injury and may not take a form humiliating to the responsible State. |
Example 1. State A's navy illegally seizes a commercial fishing vessel belonging to State B in State B's EEZ and detains its crew for a month, causing the owner to lose a full month of potential profit.
Answer:
In this case, full reparation by State A would likely involve a combination of all three forms:
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Cessation: State A must immediately cease the wrongful act by releasing the crew and the vessel.
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Restitution: State A must return the vessel and its equipment to State B's nationals.
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Compensation: Since restitution alone does not cover the full injury, State A must pay compensation for the financially assessable damage, which would include the profits lost during the month of detention and any damage to the vessel.
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Satisfaction: As the illegal seizure was an affront to State B's sovereignty and rights under the law of the sea, State A could also be required to provide satisfaction, for instance, by issuing a formal apology to State B for the violation.